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The German financial system is the archetype of a bank-dominated system. This implies that 
organized equity markets are, in some sense, underdeveloped. The purpose of this paper is, 
first, to describe the German equity markets and, second, to analyze whether it is underdevel-
oped in any meaningful sense. In the descriptive part we provide a detailed account of the 
microstructure of the German equity markets, putting special emphasis on recent develop-
ments.  
When comparing the German market with its peers, we find that it is indeed underdeveloped 
with respect to market capitalization. In terms of liquidity, on the other hand, the German  
equity market is not generally underdeveloped. It does, however, lack a liquid market for 
block trading.  
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I.  Introduction
The German financial system is the archetype of a bank-dominated system. This implies that
organized capital markets are, in some sense, underdeveloped. Underdevelopment can, how-
ever, mean different things. In the present case two interpretations are potentially relevant:
1.  A capital market may be underdeveloped in terms of volume. In a bank-dominated finan-
cial system one would expect the market for equity and corporate bonds to be smaller than
they would be under a market-oriented system.
2.  A capital market may be underdeveloped in terms of the organization of trading, of its
operational efficiency and, as a result, in terms of liquidity and transaction costs.
The objective of this chapter is to take a closer look at the German capital market. The atten-
tion is limited to the equity markets. Corresponding to the two interpretations given above we
address two specific questions. First, we present evidence on the volume of the German eq-
uity markets. Second, we describe the organization of the German equity markets, giving spe-
cial attention to recent developments. We further present empirical evidence on the opera-
tional efficiency and liquidity of the German equity market.
The chapter is organized as follows. In section II we present empirical evidence relating to the
volume of the German equity markets and, in particular, to the changes in the recent past.
Section III describes the microstructure of the German equity markets and presents evidence
on their liquidity. Section IV concludes and discusses the implications of our findings for the
organization of equity markets in Germany.
II.  The German Equity Market
One would expect that in a bank-dominated financial system internal financing and bank
loans are the dominant sources of funds whereas equity and bond issues are likely to play a
much lesser role. The empirical results of Hackethal / Schmidt (2000) clearly support that
view. They find that securitized funds account for 12% of the volume of physical investment
in Germany as compared to 48% in the US.
1 Rajan / Zingales (1995), using data from 1991,
analyze the capital structure of non-financial exchange-listed companies in 7 countries. The
                                                
1 Note that this result stands in contrast to the findings by Mayer (1988). Hackethal / Schmidt (2000)
argue that this is due to implicit assumptions in his methodology. See their paper for a detailed discussion of this
issue.3
ratio of book equity to total capital is lowest in Germany, amounting to 28%. Figures for non-
listed companies are far lower than that. In 2000, the average ratio (over all companies) of
book equity to total capital was a mere 17% (DAI Factbook 2002, relying on data from Deut-
sche Bundesbank).
It is obvious that these financing patterns have implications for the volume of the securities
markets. This conjecture is corroborated by the figures in Table 1. The corporate bond market
is, despite an almost thirtyfold increase in volume since 1995, still negligible. The market
value of exchange-listed equity has more than doubled in the last decade and now amounts to
647.5 billion  \HDUHQG7KLVLQFUHDVHLVQRWGXHWRWKHEXOOPDUNHWRIWKHQLQHWLHV
This is evidenced by the fact that the nominal value of equity
2 increased at about the same
rate.
In spite of this increase the market capitalization of listed German firms is low in comparison
to other countries. Table 2 presents figures on market capitalization as a percentage of the
gross domestic product (GDP). The figures for Germany are way below the figures for the
UK or the US (the archetypes of market-dominated financial systems). They are even lower
than the average for the Euro countries. The increase in the market capitalization documented
in Table 1 has not led to a convergence because the market capitalization in the other coun-
tries has increased at about the same rate.
Insert Table 1 about here
Insert Table 2 about here
The low market capitalization does, of course, have implications for the portfolios of German
households. Table 3 documents that less than 10% of the population over 14 own shares. In
2001, share holdings and mutual fund holdings together amounted to slightly more than 20%
of the financial assets. When interpreting this figure, note that total financial assets do not
include the value of pension claims against the state-run social security system.
The host of the financial assets is made up by bank deposits, bonds,
3 and life insurance con-
tracts (see Börsch-Supan / Eymann 2000 for a more detailed analysis). Despite a recent in-
                                                
2 The nominal value of the equity is a part of the book equity shown on the balance sheet. It is equivalent
to the “gezeichnetes Kapital” (nominal capital) of the firm defined in the corporate charter.
3 This statement does not stand in contrast to the low volume of the corporate bond market. There are
large markets for government bonds and bonds issued by banks. The latter market comprises, among others,
mortgage-backed bonds (Pfandbriefe).4
crease in private share ownership, figures for Germany are, again, lower than those for the US
and the UK. For example, in 1998, 33.8% of the individuals in the US owned shares directly,
48.5% owned shares and / or mutual funds (New York Stock Exchange 2000).
Insert Table 3 about here
Since households only invest a small percentage of their wealth in the stock market, the frac-
tion of households in total shareholdings is low. Figure 1 shows the distribution of share-
holdings. Households directly hold 15.3% of the shares (compared to 39.1% for households
and non-profit organizations in the US). An additional 14.0% (US: 19.3%) is held by mutual
funds which, in turn, are at least partially held by households. Nonfinancial firms own 32.5%
of the shares. Banks and insurance companies hold 13.0% and 9.7%, respectively (US: 1.9%
and 6.5%, respectively). Shareholdings of the state are negligible.
Insert Figure 1 about here
The analysis of the market capitalization and the structure of household portfolios leads to a
picture that is consistent with what one would expect to find in a bank-oriented financial sys-
tem. The corporate bond market is close to non-existent, equity market capitalization is low
and only a small fraction of physical investment is financed by securitized funds. Household
portfolios are tilted towards bank deposits, (government and bank-issued) bonds and insur-
ance contracts. The conclusion thus is that the German equity market is indeed underdevel-
oped in terms of volume.
There is a second dimension along which the German capital market has been underdeveloped
(as compared to US standards, at least): the legal dimension. The degree of shareholder pro-
tection is low in Germany, as is evidenced by the international survey in La Porta et al.
(1998). Things are beginning to change, however.
4 For example, non-voting preferred stock is
coming out of fashion, disclosure requirements have been increased and a takeover law is in
effect since 2002. Also in 2002, the 4. Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz was passed. It comprised
changes to the Exchange Law (Börsengesetz) and to the Securities Trading Act (Wertpapier-
handelsgesetz) aiming at more flexibility for the organization of exchanges, higher transpar-
ency and more stringent insider trading regulation. Actually, a new law (5. Finanz-
marktförderungsgesetz) is in preparation. One of its main objective is to strengthen share-
holder rights.
                                                
4 See Nowak (2001) for a detailed description and interpretation of recent legal changes.5
Insider trading has not been prohibited until the mid-nineties. The Wertpapierhandelsgesetz
(Securities Trading Act) was passed in 1994 (at least in part as a response to international
pressure). Among the "developed countries" listed in table 1 of Bhattacharya / Daouk (2001),
Germany was, together with Spain, the last country to pass insider trading laws. The Wertpa-
pierhandelsgesetz prohibits insider trading and enacted the Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wert-
papierhandel, based in Frankfurt, as a supervisory unit. In 2002 the Bundesaufsichtsamt für
den Wertpapierhandel was merged with the banking supervisory unit (Bundesaufsichtsamt für
das Kreditwesen) and the insurance supervision (Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Versicherungs-
wesen) to form the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin), located in Bonn
and Frankfurt. The number of investigations in 2001 [2000] was 55 [51]. 25 [22] cases were
handed over to the court.
5
The recent increase in market capitalization, the number of listed companies and private share
ownership together with changes in legislation may be indicating a convergence of the Ger-
man equity market towards a more market-oriented system. The increase in market volume is,
however, not markedly different from the growth in other countries and it may, therefore, be
premature to conclude that the financing patterns of German corporations are really changing
on a broad basis.
III.  The (micro)structure of the German equity market
III.1.  Trading Venues
Stock trading in Germany is fragmented both vertically and horizontally. In the vertical di-
mension there have traditionally been three market segments. The most liquid stocks are listed
in the “amtlicher Markt”.
6 The “geregelter Markt”, created in the mid-eighties, is a segment
for mid- and small-caps. Finally, the “Freiverkehr” is the least regulated segment. In 1997
Deutsche Börse AG has created the “Neuer Markt”, a segment for growth stocks that has at-
tracted approximately 350 companies since its inception. Listing requirements in the Neuer
Markt were stricter than in other segments. Inspired by the initial success of the Neuer Markt,
Deutsche Börse AG has created an additional segment called SMAX. This was a segment for
                                                
5 The figures are taken from Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel (2002).
6 “Most liquid” is a euphemism because a considerable number of these stocks are rather illiquid in terms
of market capitalization and trading volume.6
small caps in more traditional (“old economy”) industries. Listing requirements were lower
than in the Neuer Markt but higher than in the geregelter Markt.
Following the slump of “new economy” share prices, a large number of bankruptcies of Neuer
Markt firms and several cases of fraud, investors lost confidence in the growth segment. Con-
sequently, Deutsche Börse AG closed both the Neuer Markt and the SMAX. At the same
time, market segments were re-organized. This was facilitated by a change in law that gave
the exchange more discretion in setting the listing requirements. Besides the unregulated
Freiverkehr, there are two segments:
7
General standard is the basis category. It is designed for smaller companies with a domestic
focus. Listing requirements are low, and are not tailored to the needs of international inves-
tors. The Prime standard is designed for companies aiming at international visibility. Listing
requirements include
·  application of international accounting standards (IFRS or US-GAAP)
 8
·  quarterly reporting
·  publication of a “financial calendar” listing the most important corporate events (share-
holders’ meeting, analyst conferences etc.)
·  regular analysts conferences (minimum one per year)
·  current reporting and ad-hoc disclosure in English.
A prime standard listing is required for a stock to be included in one of the indices calculated
and published by Deutsche Börse AG.
9 Figure 2 shows the most important members of the
                                                
7 Strictly speaking there are four segments. The amtlicher Markt and the geregelter Markt are defined by
law (Börsengesetz, Börsenzulassungs-Verordnung). Any company seeking a listing may choose either of the
two. In both cases, the company may opt for a “general standard” or a “prime standard” listing. This results in a
total of four segments. However, the differences between amtlicher Markt and geregelter Markt within either the
general standard and the prime standard category are immaterial. Note that the segments amtlicher Markt and
geregelter Markt, since they are defined by law, exist at all German exchanges. The categories general standard
and prime standard are specific the markets operated by Deutsche Börse AG, i.e., to the Frankfurt Stock Ex-
change and Xetra.
8 Leuz / Verrecchia (2000) present evidence that switching from the German to an international reporting
regime is associated with lower bid-ask spreads and higher trading volume.
9 An exception is the CDAX, a broad index that includes all listed companies, i.e., those with a prime
standard listing as well as those with a general standard listing. Even before the inception of the new segmenta-7
index “family”. At the very top there is the DAX, a blue chip index comprising the 30 most
liquid forms. The MDAX contains the following 50 “old economy” firms. The SDAX is
comprised of an additional 50 “old economy” firms. The TecDax contains the 30 most liquid
high tech (“new economy”) firms. All firms listed in the prime standard segment are con-
tained in the prime all share index, which is subdivided into 18 industry indices. All indices
are calculated as performance indices.
10 Besides these stock indices, Deutsche Börse AG
publishes the VDAX, a volatility index calculated from implied volatilities inferred from eq-
uity option prices.
Insert Figure 2 about here
As to the horizontal dimension, trading is fragmented between eight exchanges and the elec-
tronic trading system Xetra. The most liquid stocks are traded on all markets. Among the
eight exchanges the Frankfurt stock exchange is by far the largest.
11 We therefore restrict the
description of the trading protocol to the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE) and Xetra. Both
markets are run by Deutsche Börse AG
12 which, since February 2001, is itself a listed com-
pany.
III.2.  Floor Trading
The trading system of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange bears many similarities to the one of the
New York Stock Exchange. The stocks are handled by a specialist, the Skontroführer (for-
merly Makler). He conducts an opening call auction at 9:00 a.m. After the opening auction,
                                                                                                                                                        
tion did Deutsche Börse AG use its discretion in the composition of its indices to exert pressure on companies.
This pressure aimed at increased information disclosure and compliance with certain codes of conduct. For ex-
ample, in order to be included in the DAX or MDAX a company had to publish quarterly reports. In 2001, the
car manufacturer Porsche AG was excluded from the MDAX because the company refused to comply with this
requirement. As Porsche still refuses to publish quarterly reports, Deutsche Börse AG declined a prime standard
listing.
10 For details on the indices published by Deutsche Börse AG, see Deutsche Börse AG (2003).
11 Regional exchanges exist in Berlin, Bremen, Düsseldorf, Hamburg, Hannover, Stuttgart and München.
Some of them have specialized on specific financial instruments. The Stuttgart Stock Exchange, for example,
operates the warrant market EUWAX, the world’s largest derivatives exchange in terms of listed instruments.
12 The fact that Deutsche Börse AG operates a floor-based and an electronic market is, at least in part, due
to the legal nature of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. See section III.4 for details.8
the continuous trading session starts.
13 The specialist has exclusive access to the limit order
book. He is allowed to (but, unlike the NYSE specialist, not obliged to) trade for his own ac-
count. He announces bid and ask prices which may represent either orders in the limit order
book or his willingness to trade for his own account. The trading day ends with a closing auc-
tion which is held after 7:30 p.m.
It is worthwhile to ask whether the specialist system offers specific advantages that may ex-
plain its survival despite the competition of the electronic trading system. Some papers have
addressed this issue and analyze the floor-based trading system of the Frankfurt Stock Ex-
change in detail.
Kehr / Krahnen / Theissen (2001) analyze the role of the specialist in the call auctions on the
floor. They find that specialist participation reduces return volatility. They further document
that the specialists do, on average, not earn profits on the trades they make on their own ac-
counts. Their income thus appears to be restricted to the commissions they receive. A similar
result for the continuous trading session is found by Freihube et al. (1999). Their findings also
suggest that the specialist is the dominant supplier of liquidity on the floor of the Frankfurt
Stock Exchange. The quoted spread is narrower than the spread obtained from the orders in
the limit order book maintained by the specialist in more than 55% of the cases.
14 In these
cases the spread represents the willingness of the specialist to trade on his own account rather
than on behalf of a customer. Further, more than 46% of the transactions occur at prices inside
the quoted spread. In many of these cases the specialist is trading on his own account. In fact,
Freihube et al. (1999) find that the specialist participates in more than 80% of the transactions
and accounts for more than 40% of the trading volume. These figures are higher than the
comparable figures for the NYSE reported by Madhavan / Sofianos (1998).
These results lead to the question of whether there is any advantage in having one dominant
supplier of liquidity. A starting point for answering that question is the observation that spe-
cialist systems like those of the NYSE and the Frankfurt Stock Exchange are not anonymous.
                                                
13 For a large number of less liquid stocks there is only one daily call auction and no continuous trading
session. The same applies for Xetra.
14 Chung / Van Ness / Van Ness (1999) report a comparable figure for the NYSE. There, the quoted
spread is narrower than the spread calculated from the best bid and offer in the limit order book in only 29.3% of
the cases.9
The non-anonymity may allow the specialist to identify informed traders ex ante or ex post.
15
Ex-ante identification may be based on observed trader behavior and enables the specialist to
offer less favorable prices to those traders that he considers to be informed. Ex-post identifi-
cation of informed traders allows reputation building. The specialist will offer less favorable
prices in future transactions to traders that have traded on private information in the past.
16
The specialist’s sanctioning power may induce traders to trade less aggressively on their in-
formation in order to retain their reputation and thus receive favorable prices in future trans-
actions. This, in turn, decreases the degree of adverse information and may lead to a lower
adverse selection component in effective bid-ask spreads. To fully exploit the information
inferred (or, at least, inferable) from trader identities, it is advantageous to centralize the order
flow. In a decentralized dealer market (like, e.g., NASDAQ) each dealer only knows the
identities of a subset of those who have traded. In the more centralized specialist system, on
the other hand, the information is centralized at the specialist’s desk.
17
If the specialist is to make use of his information he must be able to price-discriminate. This
is, however, easily achieved. The specialist may quote a large spread and offer price im-
provement to counterparties deemed uninformed (i.e., he executes transactions initiated by
these traders at prices inside the quoted spread). Price improvement is thus explained by lower
adverse selection costs. This has two testable implications.
1.  Granting price improvement does not reduce the specialist’s profits.
2.  Since price improvement is offered because the adverse selection risk is lower, price-
improved transactions contain less information about the future price of the stock. Conse-
quently, there is less need to adjust the quoted prices after the transaction.
                                                
15 Note that it is not required that the specialist is able to identify informed traders with certainty. It is
sufficient if he is able to correctly assign to some traders a higher probability of trading on private information.
16 See Benveniste / Marcus / Wilhelm (1992), Chan / Weinstein (1993) and Desgranges / Foucault (2002)
for a detailed analysis. The first two papers take into account the fact that traders on the floor are often brokers
that represent customer orders.
17 The empirical results in Garfinkel / Nimalendran (2003) are consistent with this interpretation. They
analyze spreads on insider trading days, defined as days on which officers or directors have traded in shares of
their company. They find that, in response to the higher degree of informational asymmetry, spreads increase
both on the NYSE and in Nasdaq, but that the increase is more pronounced on the NYSE. The order flow is more
centralized on the NYSE than in NASDAQ. This may enable the specialist to better exploit the potential benefits
of non-anonymity.10
Theissen (2003) uses data from the Frankfurt Stock Exchange to test these hypotheses empiri-
cally. He first documents that price improvement is frequently granted. On average, more than
40% of the transactions are price-improved. Average effective spreads are 30% lower than
average quoted spreads. He then decomposes the spread into two components. The realized
spread measures the revenue of the specialist whereas the adverse selection component meas-
ures the amount lost to informed traders.
The results are fully consistent with the first implication. The realized spread on price-
improved transactions is not smaller than the corresponding figure for non price-improved
trades. A regression analysis including several control variables also yields the conclusion that
there is no systematic relation between price improvement and specialist revenue. The second
implication is tested by relating the adjustment of the quote midpoint after a transaction to the
price improvement. It is found that the quote adjustment is significantly larger after trans-
actions at a price equaling the bid or ask quote than after price-improved transactions. Again,
the result is confirmed by a regression analysis including control variables.
The empirical work thus suggests that the specialist function is beneficial and may help to
reduce adverse selection costs.
III.3.  Screen Trading
In 1991 the electronic trading system IBIS was introduced. IBIS was an anonymous electronic
open limit order book, organized as a “hit-and-take” system in the terminology of Domowitz
(1992).
18 In November 1997, IBIS was replaced by Xetra (Exchange Electronic Trading).
Xetra is also used by the Austrian Stock Exchange and the Irish Stock Exchange. It is an
anonymous electronic open limit order book with embedded call auctions. All stocks that are
listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange are also traded in Xetra. Further, there are specific
segments for foreign stocks (Xetra Stars). Table 4 presents a detailed description of the trad-
ing protocol.
Insert Table 4 about here
Trading starts at 8:50 a.m. with an opening call auction. A second and a third call auction are
held between 1:00 p.m. and 1:15 p.m. and between 5:30 p.m. and 5:45 p.m., respectively. The
trading day ends with a closing auction at 8 p.m. Between the call auctions, continuous trad-
ing takes place. The trading session is organized as a continuous auction where investors can
                                                
18 For a detailed description of IBIS see Schmidt / Iversen (1993).11
place limit orders or accept orders which were submitted by others. Trading is completely
anonymous.
Since October 1998 there are designated sponsors for many stocks outside the DAX. In the
(now defunct) market segments Neuer Markt and SMAX, each listed company was required
to have at least one (SMAX) or two (Neuer Markt) sponsors. Since March 2003, firms are
sorted into two categories according to their liquidity. Those in the low-liquidity category are
only traded continuously when they have at least one designated sponsor. The institution of
the sponsor has been introduced in order to increase market liquidity. The sponsor has to
quote bid and ask prices and participate in the call auctions. There are minimum requirements,
differentiated by stock liquidity, for the spreads, the quoted depths and the participation fre-
quencies in the call auctions. The sponsors are regularly rated by the exchange. The ratings
are made public.
The co-existence of floor and screen trading raises the question of whether one of the systems
is generally superior. The German market offers almost ideal conditions to compare floor and
screen trading. Since both markets are liquid, operate in parallel and are based in the same
country,
19 many of the ambiguities present in other studies are absent.
20 Empirical research
has addressed two issues, liquidity and informational efficiency.
Screen-based trading systems are likely to offer higher operational efficiency. The possibility
of remote access to the system may increase the number of market participants and, thereby,
liquidity. On the other hand, a floor-based specialist system may (as argued in the preceding
section) be better suited to cope with adverse selection problems. When comparing floor and
screen trading systems we should therefore expect
1.  to see a larger fraction of informed traders in the electronic trading system than on the
floor,
2.  to find a larger adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread in the electronic trading
system and
                                                
19 Quite a number of papers (see Breedon / Holland 1998 for a survey) analyze the parallel trading of
German Bund futures on the (floor-based) LIFFE and Eurex (formerly Deutsche Terminbörse). These studies are
potentially affected by the facts that, first, Germany is the home market of the contract (although the contract has
been “invented” by the LIFFE) and, second, that the market shares of the two markets have differed substantially
in almost every sample period.
20 One limitation remains, however. Results of a comparisons of two markets that exist in parallel do not
necessarily carry over to a situation in which a floor-based or an electronic exchange operates in isolation.12
3.  to find that floor trading is particularly advantageous for stocks with high adverse selec-
tion risk.
Empirical research into these issue has been (and, to a certain extent, still is) complicated by
the non-availability of comprehensive data sets including quote data from the floor. Schmidt /
Iversen / Treske (1993) and Schmidt / Oesterhelweg / Treske (1996) compare floor and screen
trading for German stocks. They relate transaction prices from the floor to spreads from the
screen trading system and find that transaction prices from the floor tend to lie inside this
spread. This allows conclusions about the relative magnitude of the spreads in the two trading
systems, but it does not allow to decompose the spreads into its components.
21
Grammig / Schiereck / Theissen (2001) have access to a more comprehensive data set. They
extend the method developed by Easley et al. (1996) to compare the probability of informed
trading on the floor of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and in IBIS (the predecessor of Xetra, in
operation from 1991 through 1997). They find that, first, the probability of informed trading is
significantly lower on the floor and, second, that both the size of the spread and the adverse
selection component are positively related to the estimated probabilities of information-based
trading.
Theissen (2002a) uses the same data set to analyze the bid-ask spreads in the two trading sys-
tems directly. He confirms the hypothesis that the adverse selection component is larger in
IBIS than on the floor. The effective spreads tend to be larger on the floor for large stocks and
larger on IBIS for small stocks. To the extent that firm size is a valid proxy for the adverse
selection risk (an assumption substantiated by, among others, the results of Easley et al. 1996
who show that the probability of informed trading is negatively related to firm size) this con-
firms the conjecture that floor trading is better suited for stocks with high adverse selection
risk. This conclusion is corroborated by an analysis of market shares. The market share of the
electronic trading system is negatively related to the total trading volume of the stock and is at
least partially negatively related to return volatility. Finally, it is documented that spreads in
the electronic trading system respond more heavily to changes in return volatility.
What do these results imply for price discovery in floor and screen trading systems? As
documented by Grammig / Schiereck / Theissen (2001), the anonymous electronic trading
                                                
21 Besides that, there is a potential bias in the methodology. Observations are recorded conditional on a
transaction occurring on the floor. If transactions on the floor occur when the floor spread is low, this may bias
the results in favor of the floor.13
system attracts a higher fraction of informed traders than the floor. This entails the prediction
that the electronic trading system impounds new information faster into prices. Three further
arguments corroborate this prediction. Orders can be entered faster into an electronic system
and the execution of an order is immediate. Further, it is easier to disseminate market infor-
mation, thereby increasing the transparency of the market and the information available to the
traders. Finally, greater pre-trade transparency allows to more accurately estimate the price
impact of a trade.
The magnitude of the transaction costs determines whether a trader can profitably trade on a
given piece of information. Given the results on the relation between spreads and firm size
described above, one should therefore expect the share of the electronic trading system in the
price discovery process to be positively related to firm size.
Grünbichler / Longstaff / Schwartz (1994) were the first to analyze price discovery in floor
and screen trading systems using data from the German market. They compare prices of the
DAX index calculated from stock prices on the floor to the prices of the DAX futures contract
which is traded electronically. They find that the screen-traded future leads the stock market.
The Bund futures contract, traded on the floor of the LIFFE and in the electronic DTB (now
EUREX), has been analyzed in several papers (Breedon / Holland 1998, Fraser-Jenkins 1998,
Kofman / Moser 1997, Martens 1998, Shyy / Lee 1995). Although the conclusions reached in
these papers differ (partly due to different sample periods), the balance of the results indicates
that the electronic market leads the floor. It should be noted, however, that the electronic mar-
ket is the home market. Therefore, it may be the price-leader for reasons other than the trading
mechanism.
The German stock market with its unique feature of parallel floor and screen trading has also
been subject to empirical investigation. Kirchner / Schlag (1998) document that the prices in
the electronic trading system adjust to the price established in the opening auction on the
floor. Both Kempf / Korn (1998) and Freihube / Theissen (2001) compare the two markets
using stock index data. Kempf / Korn (1998) find that the integration between the electronic
trading system and the (equally electronic) futures market is higher than the degree of inte-
gration between the floor and the futures market. Freihube / Theissen (2001) document that
the screen-based XETRA system contributes more to the price discovery process than the
floor for the blue-chip index DAX. The reverse is true, however, for the mid-cap index
MDAX.
Stock-level analyses are provided by Bühler / Grünbichler / Schmidt (1995), Kehr (1997),
Kirchner (1999) and Theissen (2002b). The results do not support the hypothesis that one of14
the markets is the leader in the price discovery process. The latter paper provides evidence
that the contribution of the electronic trading system to the price discovery process is posi-
tively related to firm size.
22
Taken together, the empirical results support the hypothesis that floor trading has specific
advantages that are most evident for stocks with high adverse selection risk. This does not
necessarily yield the conclusion that floor trading should be retained. This is unlikely to be an
efficient solution because it would entrench the coexistence of two trading systems for the
same stocks. The results may, however, yield insights into the appropriate design of electronic
trading systems. What appears to be important is to reduce the anonymity of the trading sys-
tem. It may also be worthwhile to consider the introduction of a specialist into the system, at
least for less liquid stocks.
III.4.  Governance Structure of the Exchange
We restrict the description to Deutsche Börse AG. Deutsche Börse AG operates the Frankfurt
Stock Exchange, the electronic trading system Xetra and has a 50% stake in the Zürich-based
EUREX, the world’s largest derivatives exchange. It is thus by far the most important ex-
change in Germany.
The roots of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange go back to the 16th century. The exchange was
governed by public law and was, until 1991, run by the Industrie- und Handelskammer
(Chamber of Commerce and Industry) Frankfurt. Deutsche Börse AG was founded in 1990 as
Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse AG and renamed Deutsche Börse AG in 1992. It took over the
operation of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and also operates the electronic trading system
Xetra. Besides its stake in EUREX, Deutsche Börse AG owns a number of subsidiaries and
holds stakes in a variety of companies, the most important being its 100% stake in Clear-
stream International.
Deutsche Börse AG is owned by banks and other financial institutions. Until early 2001,
banks owned 81.9% of the capital. The regional exchanges held another 10.1% and the spe-
cialists owned 5.3%. In February 2001 Deutsche Börse AG went public. Approximately 25%
of the capital were offered to the public. This reduced, but did not eliminate, the majority
                                                
22 Grammig / Melvin / Schlag (2001) analyze price discovery of dually listed stocks in Xetra and on the
New York Stock Exchange (which is organized in a way similar to the Frankfurt Stock Exchange). They find
that Xetra dominates the price discovery process. The authors point out that this result is at least in part due to
the fact that Germany is the home market.15
control exerted by banks. The stake of the four largest German banks was reduced from
35.2% to 25.1%. According to German corporate law, a 25+% stake (“Sperrminorität”) is
sufficient to block important decisions like changes in the corporate charter or seasoned eq-
uity offerings. In October 2002, Deutsche Bank AG sold its 9.3% stake to institutional inves-
tors.
23 Therefore, banks are loosing their role as the dominant owner group. However, the
supervisory board of Deutsche Börse AG is still dominated by banks. It consists of 21 mem-
bers, 7 of which are employee representatives. The remaining 14 members are appointed by
the shareholders’ meeting. 12 of them are members or former members of the executive board
of a bank or a bank subsidiary.
Although Deutsche Börse AG is a privately owned company, it is not completely free in the
strategic decisions it takes. This is due to the ambiguous legal status of the Frankfurt Stock
Exchange. Deutsche Börse AG clearly favors electronic trading and would probably dispense
with the trading floor. There is, however, a juridical debate about whether Deutsche Börse AG
is allowed to do so. The Frankfurt Stock Exchange is governed by public law and is only op-
erated (but not owned) by Deutsche Börse AG. Some authors argue that the allowance to op-
erate the exchange entails the obligation to do so and thus prevents a closure of the floor.
Therefore, legal action may be required in order to promote some of the necessary changes in
the structure of the German equity markets.
III.5.  The Liquidity of the German Equity Market: International Comparison
In this section we present descriptive statistics on the liquidity of the German Stock Market
using both trading volume and execution costs as measures of liquidity. Table 5 compares the
trading volume (in US-$ million) and the turnover (the ratio of trading volume to market
capitalization) for four major exchanges. The figures indicate that turnover is higher in Ger-
many than in other countries. It should be noted, however, that volume figures are known to
be unreliable and should, therefore, be interpreted with caution.
Insert Table 5 about here
Booth et al. (1999) compare quoted spreads for the 30 most liquid stocks from Germany's
IBIS system (which, in 1997, was replaced by Xetra) to those from the 30 most liquid Nasdaq
stocks. Spreads in IBIS are lower (0.83% as compared to 1.07%). Part of this difference is
                                                
23 When the transaction became known, Deutsche Bank stated that the transaction would not impair the
good relation to Deutsche Börse AG. Only some days later, however, Deutsche Bank announced that it would
introduce a system to introduce in-house internalization of customer orders.16
likely to be due to the fact that the German stocks are more liquid (in terms of volume) than
their Nasdaq counterparts. In addition, the data used is from 1991. Using data from 1996, El-
lul (2002) compares transaction costs in IBIS with those in the French CAC system and in
SEAQ. Again, transaction costs turn out to be lowest in IBIS.
Jain (2001) collected data from Bloomberg for 51 exchanges. Table 6 summarizes some of his
results on transaction costs. The German market is characterized by high turnover (defined as
the ratio of trading volume to market capitalization). Transaction costs are measured by
quoted and effective bid-ask spreads. Both measures indicate that transaction costs in Ger-
many are lower than in the UK but higher than in the US (and, particularly, at the NYSE) and
in Japan.
24
Insert Table 6 about here
The Plexus Group (2000) also conducted an international comparison of execution costs
based on the company’s database. Table 7 is based on data which the Plexus Group, Inc., gen-
erously provided. The Table reports transaction costs, measured in basis points, for large, mid,
and small cap stocks. Negative figures correspond to positive transaction costs.
25 Figures are
differentiated with respect to the relative order size (order size in relation to average daily
volume of the stock in question). This differentiation results in a more detailed picture. The
results indicate that trading midcaps in Germany is expensive. Execution costs for small and
medium sized orders in both large and small caps are similar to those in the US. Large orders
(where "large" means orders exceeding 50% of the average daily trading volume) are associ-
ated with high execution costs.
We do not have an explanation for the high transaction costs associated with trading mid caps.
The high costs for large trades lead to the conclusion that Germany is in need of a cost-
efficient market for block trades.
Insert Table 7 about here
                                                
24 London Economics (2002) also compared transaction costs in different markets. Their approach does,
however, suffer from methodological problems. To give just one example: The authors claim to have calculated
effective spreads for far more German and French stocks than are continuously traded in these markets. We
therefore disregard their results.
25 The data is based on the costs of institutional trades reported to the Plexus Group, Inc., by its clients. A
positive number indicates that the transaction costs were negative. This may happen if the institutions acted as
suppliers of liquidity, thereby earning, rather than paying, the spread.17
III.6.  Recent Developments
Recently, the exchange came under pressure from different sides. Institutional investors
throughout Europe are pushing towards a unified equity market at least for blue chips. They
aim at a decrease in transaction costs, most notably clearing and settlement costs. Deutsche
Börse AG has reacted to that pressure with its attempted merger with the London Stock Ex-
change (LSE) and its acquisition of the 50% of Clearstream it did not yet own. After the fail-
ure of the merger with the LSE there is room for speculation about future developments.
Whether Deutsche Börse AG, which, as it stands, is isolated, can successfully prevent poten-
tial competitors from successfully entering the market is an open question. In a publication on
behalf of Deutsche Börse AG, dated December 1999 (Dornau 1999), it is argued that Xetra is
the cost leader and, therefore, the potential for new entrants is limited. This conclusion stands
in contrast to the claim by some institutional investors that clearing and settlement costs are
much higher in Germany (and Europe in general) than in the US.
On the retail end of the market, both some of the regional exchanges (most notably Stuttgart)
and a number of broker-dealers are competing for retail order flow. The Stuttgart Stock Ex-
change has taken several measures to increase its attractiveness for private investors. The ex-
change extended the trading hours, abolished minimum trade size requirements and guaran-
teed execution at a price no worse than the prevailing Xetra quotes. As a consequence, the
Stuttgart Stock Exchange has substantially increased its market share and has forced Deutsche
Börse AG to take similar measures. Very recently, NASDAQ has joined with the regional
exchanges in Berlin and Bremen and three banks (Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank and comdi-
rect, a subsidiary of Commerzbank) to form NASDAQ Deutschland. Since March 21, 2003,
NASDAQ Deutschlands operates an electronic auction market with additional liquidity sup-
ply through mandatory market making. Whether the new trading system will attract sufficient
order flow remains to be seen.
Some broker-dealers, in conjunction with direct brokers, offer OTC trading for retail custom-
ers, mainly in blue chips. As there is no such thing as the US intermarket trading system, best
execution is not legally enforced (but may be guaranteed by the broker-dealer). It appears that
the economics behind this OTC trading is not dissimilar to the economics underlying the
payment for order flow arrangements in the US. Retail orders are less affected by adverse
selection problems and are, therefore, profitable. It may thus pay to improve the service for
retail investors in order to attract and execute their orders.
Large banks (most notably Deutsche Bank AG) were striving towards inhouse execution of
orders. Inhouse execution may mean crossing of customer orders or execution of customer18
orders against the book of the bank (i.e., the bank acts as a market maker). Apparently, Deut-
sche Börse AG considered this to be a serious threat to its position. In September 2002, Deut-
sche Börse AG therefore introduced a system called Xetra Best that enables participating
“best executors” to internalize customer order flow (or purchased order flow) and execute the
orders in Xetra. The customer is guaranteed a price that improves by at least one Cent over
the price the order would have received had it been routed to the Xetra order book. By creat-
ing this system, Deutsche Börse AG supports the diversion of order flow from its own trading
platforms, but participates, through royalties, in the profits generated by inhouse execution.
26
However, the inception of Xetra Best came too late to prevent Deutsche Bank from introduc-
ing its own system, called Price Improvement System (PIP). Furthermore, NASDAQ
Deutschland also allows internalization through a system called BestEx.
Internalization, if performed on a large scale, potentially impairs overall market quality by
cream-skimming uninformed order flow. Liquidity providers in the main market face higher
adverse selection risks and may respond with higher spreads. These spreads, in turn, deter-
mine the prices at which the internalized orders will be executed. It is thus possible that inter-
nalization may lead to a general increase in transaction costs. The US experience with pur-
chased order flow has, however, shown that this is not a necessary consequence. Therefore,
empirical studies are required before the economic consequences of internalization can be
assessed.
IV.  Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to describe the German equity market and to analyze whether
it is underdeveloped in terms of volume or operational efficiency and liquidity. The German
equity market is, if related to the size of the economy, small. This is a natural consequence of
a bank-dominated financial system.
The microstructure of the German equity market exhibits a number of peculiarities that make
it a worthwhile object of empirical investigation. In particular, the co-existence of floor trad-
ing and electronic trading is a rather unique feature. Empirical research, briefly surveyed in
section III.3, supports the conclusion that floor trading has specific advantages that are most
evident for stocks with high adverse selection risk. These results yield insights into the appro-
                                                
26 For a detailed account of Xetra Best (though in German) see Theissen (2002c).19
priate design of electronic trading systems. They should be interpreted as a guideline towards
the improvement of electronic trading systems rather than as a defense of floor trading.
An international comparison of execution costs leads to the conclusion that trading midcaps
and executing large orders is expensive on the German market. We do not have a good expla-
nation for the first result. The second result, however, points to a deficiency of the German
market, namely, the non-existence of a cost-efficient market for block trades.
An analysis of recent trends yields a somewhat diffuse picture. On the one hand, there is a
trend towards an international consolidation of markets in Europe, evidenced, e.g., by the
creation of Euronext. On the other hand, proprietary trading systems and internalization lead
to a fragmentation at least at the retail end of the market. In light of this the creation of an
intermarket trading system that serves as a verifiable benchmark for best execution for cus-
tomer orders should be considered.
Some of the recent developments in Germany bear many similarities to the evolution of trad-
ing systems in the US. Much of the research devoted to the US market (dealing with, e.g.,
payment for order flow) may thus ultimately become highly relevant for the German market
and may provide useful guidelines for the future development.20
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Table 1: Market volume
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monatsberichte, Deutsche Börse AG, Historical Statistics Cash Markets. The
figures for corporate bonds exclude bonds issued by banks. GDP for 1990 is for West Germany only.
1990 1995 2002
corporate bonds, face
value,  0LR
1,331 1,404 36,646
outstanding equity, nomi-
nal value,  0LR
73,977 108,001 168,716
outstanding equity, market
value,  0LR
286,938 422,523 647,492
market value of equity as a
percentage of GDP
23.1% 23.5% 30.7%
number of domestic listed
companies
649 678 86725
Table 2: Market capitalization: International comparison
Source: Deutsches Aktieninstitut: DAI-Factbook 2002.
The table shows the market capitalization as a percentage of GDP
1990 1995 2001
Germany 25.0 23.9 58.1
FRXQWULHV 27.4 28.8 70.7
UK 88.2 121.6 152.0
US 48.7 95.2 136.3
Japan 98.6 71.4 55.426
Table 3: Share ownership
Source: Deutsches Aktieninstitut: DAI-Factbook 2002
1992 1997 2001
percentage of population over 14 with share-
holdings
6.4% 6.2% 8.9%
percentage of population with mutual fund
holdings
n.a. 3.6% 15.2%
percentage of population with mutual fund
and / or share holdings
n.a. 8.9% 20.0%
private shareholdings
·   billion
·  in % of total monetary wealth
124.2
5.69
293.7
9.53
347.3
9.47
private mutual fund holdings
·   billion
·  in % of total monetary wealth
108.8
4.99
243.7
7.91
429.4
11.7127
Table 4: Equity trading in Xetra
nature of trading system
·  Electronic open limit order book
trading mechanism by stock
groups
·  Liquid stocks: call auctions (open, intradaily, close) and continuous
trading
·  Illiquid stocks: call auction
call auctions
·  Pre-trading phase with closed book, allows entry and modification of
orders
·  Indicative prices are disseminated
·  Order imbalance information provided for DAX stocks and stocks with
designated sponsors (see below)
·  Price determination based on volume maximization / order imbalance /
reference price
·  Random price determination time
admissible order types
·  Market, limit, market-to-limit, stop orders
·  Additional execution conditions admissible: immediate-or-cancel, fill-or-
kill
·  Validity constraints: good-for-day, good-till-date, good-till-cancelled
(maximum validity 90 days)
·  Admissible trading restrictions, e.g. auction only, opening only
·  Iceberg orders: specify overall volume and peak volume; iceberg orders
are not identified in the book; time stamp equal to time at which peak ap-
pears on the screen
trading hours
·  8.50 a.m. (beginning opening auction) to 8.05 p.m. (end closing auction)
·  Stocks traded by call auction only: 1.20 - 1.25 p.m.
·  Xetra XXL (block trading facility): crossings each 15 minutes from 9.30
a.m. to 6.00 p.m.
priority rules
·  Price, time (except hidden parts of iceberg orders)
transparency in continuous trad-
ing session
·  open book
·  Exception 1: hidden parts of iceberg orders
·  Exception 2: liquidity provided by designated sponsors upon quote re-
quest
Anonymity ·  Anonymous
·  Exception: Designated sponsors know identity of quote requesting party
clearing settlement ·  Settlement two workdays after transaction
·  Central counterparty to be introduced in 2003
minimum tick size ·  
·  IRULQVWUXPHQWVZLWKSULFHVEHORZ 
minimum order size
·  1 share
designated sponsors / liquidity
providers
·  Mandatory for “low liquidity” stocks that are to be traded continuously
(Stocks are categorized as high or low liquidity stocks according to exe-
cution costs and trading volume)
·  Must participate in auctions and volatility interruptions28
·  Minimum quote quantities, maximum spreads (differentiated according
to liquidity) and maximum response time specified
·  Regular performance measurement, published quarterly
·  Privileges: reduced fees, designated sponsors learn identity of quote-
requesting trader
domestic parallel trading venues
·  Floor trading on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and seven regional ex-
changes; NASDAQ Deutschland
·  OTC trading
·  Internalization of orders through XetraBest, PIP and BestEx
circuit breakers
·  Volatility interruption if potential price outside pre-defined range around
reference price 1 (the last determined price) or reference price 2 (last
auction price)
·  The width of the ranges are not disclosed to market participants and are
adapted to market conditions
·  Market order interruption: when market orders exist that are not executa-
ble
·  Trading resumes with call auction
·  Exchange can suspend trading in case of information events; orders in the
system are deleted
handling of block trades
·  Specific block trading segment (Xetra XXL)
·  Matching of orders at the Xetra quote midpoint (i.e., Xetra XXL itself
does not contribute to price discovery)
·  Anonymous, closed order book29
Table 5: Turnover (Trading volume in % of market capitalization): International com-
parison
Source: DAI Factbook 2002, original source of data: F.I.B.V. We only include countries for which volume fig-
ures according to the Trading System View (as opposed to the Regulated Environment View) were given. Fig-
ures for France are for 2000.
Germany France
(year 2000)
Japan (Tokyo) US (NYSE)
Volume in 2001
(million US-$)
1,439.9 1,064.9 1,656.7 10,388.9
turnover in 2001 118.3% 71.9% 60.0% 86.9%30
Table 6: Liquidity: International comparison I
Source: Jain (2001), Table 2.
volatility turnover quoted spread all
stocks
quoted spread
top 15 stocks
effective spread
top 15 stocks
Germany 0.11% 2.38 3.65 0.86% 0.73%
UK 0.12% 0.42 5.21 1.46% 1.25%
US – NYSE 0.12% 0.65 0.74 0.20% 0.09%
US – Nasdaq 0.42% 0.61 2.67 0.52% 1.02%
Japan 0.105 0.39 2.13 0.80% 0.72%31
Table 7: Liquidity: International comparison II
Data source: The data was generously provided by the Plexus Group, Inc.
The figures represent trading costs in basis points. For Germany (Ger), the UK and Japan (Jap), small caps are
defined as companies with market capitalization less then US-$ 1 billion, mid caps have market capitalization
between US-$ 1 and 10 billion and large caps have market capitalization of more than US-$ 10 billion. For the
US, the respective figures are (in billion US-$) less than 1, between 1 and 5, and between 5 and 25. Very large
US stocks are those with market capitalization in excess of US-$ 25 billion.
Trade size is defined relative to the average daily trading volume. The six groups are defined as less than 10%,
between 10% and 25%, between 25% and 50%, between 50% and 100%, between 100% and 250%, and more
than 250% of the average daily volume.
G e r U SU KJ a pG e rU SU KJ a pG e rU SU KJ a p
smallest na 1,19 -39,61 na -44,77 -10,20 -13,70 42,32 -13,21 -2,84 -0,47 -3,98 -1,02
2 -26,42 -31,59 -12,76 na -54,50 -9,05 -9,89 -1,11 -7,00 -2,26 -15,32 6,30 -3,49
3 -33,76 -26,35 -42,88 na -35,75 -8,34 -5,37 -28,98 -4,88 -9,50 0,13 -39,87 -10,36
4 -90,27 -18,84 -76,05 na -31,79 -14,97 -19,05 -18,11 -24,83 -4,51 -12,89 -41,14 -15,12
5 -55,24 -25,88 -29,91 -73,00 -63,00 -20,13 -8,84 -23,49 -50,90 -13,22 -24,84 -47,21 -24,45
largest -180,00 -119,55 -55,20 -196,00 -162,88 -92,53 -35,52 -152,78 -117,11 -84,30 -61,52 -170,02 -51,00
US very 
large
small caps trade 
size
large caps mid caps32
Figure 1: Shareholdings (% of total shareholdings, year end 2000)
Source: Deutsches Aktieninstitut: DAI-Factbook 2002
Households
15,3%
Nonf inanci al Fi r ms
32,5%
Sta te
0,7%
Ba nks
13,0%
Insurance Companies
9,7%
Mutual Funds
14,0%
Foreigners
14,9%33
Figure 2: Equity indices
general standard
other „prime standard“ firms
SDAX 
(50)
MDAX
(50)
Tec-
DAX
(30)
DAX
(30)
Prime 
All Share,
incl. 18 
industries*
*Automobile, Banks, Basic Resources, Chemicals, Construction, Consumer, Financial Services, Food & Beverages, Industrial,
Insurance, Media, Pharma & Healthcare, Retail, Software, Technology, Telecommunication, Transport & Logistics, Utilities.
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